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sessment of reality which is unrelated to experience and 
adhered to with strong conviction despite evidence to the 
contrary and sufficient intelligence; i.e., the patient is in-
capable of learning. Equally important is the fact that 
these delusions are not shared by others of the patient’s 
sociocultural background. At the same time, one must 
distinguish delusions from overvalued ideas, which have 
a strong emotional content and tend to polarize thinking 
but are still open to reason. 
 Acute delusions are accompanied by strong affect and 
exaggerated vigilance, a combination known as delusion-
al mood. Fear, distrust and exaggerated vigilance cause 
the patient to read meanings into perfectly mundane 
events and even see them as related. Once these delusions 
are conceived, they are linked with the patient’s emotions, 
motivations and background, instilled with meaning and 
built into his or her world of experiences, thus attaining a 
high degree of subjective certainty which places them be-
yond the reach of reason. 
 Clinical experience shows that acute delusions tend to 
become chronic. The patients systematize their delusions 
and incorporate them into their life. If delusions, espe-
cially persisting delusions, are elaborated upon through 
logical or paralogical thinking, they are called systematic 
delusions. Hence, chronic delusions are an integral part of 
the patients, constituting a part of their very thoughts, 
values, world view and goals. The contents usually relate 
to essential human experience and interaction: persecu-
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 Abstract 
 Delusional syndromes can occur in a number of psychiatric, 
neurological or other disorders. They can also be caused by 
neurotoxic agents (e.g., heavy metals) as well as substance 
addiction. There are several hypotheses on the underlying 
cognitive or emotional processes associated with organic 
factors of delusional disorders, depending on the patient 
groups examined and the methods used. The aim of this pa-
per is to provide a comprehensive review and critical assess-
ment of the various, rather heterogeneous theories in this 
field.  Copyright © 2007 S. Karger AG, Basel 
 Introduction 
 There is no generally accepted definition of delusion. 
This is remarkable – indeed, deplorable – not only be-
cause this phenomenon has been researched intensively 
ever since scientific discussion about psychiatric issues 
began some 200 years ago, but also because of the great 
clinical importance of delusions. In the pragmatic de-
scriptions (not definitions) currently used worldwide, de-
lusions often are classified as a pathological, incorrect as-
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tion, harm and jealousy (e.g., the Othello syndrome in 
paranoia and in ‘grumbler’ delusions); love and sexuality 
(erotomania); personal greatness and glory (megaloma-
nia); guilt and failure (delusional depression) as well as the 
body (hypochondriac delusions). Special cases are the 
Capgras syndrome and its subform, the Fregoli delusion. 
Patients suffering from Capgras syndrome show a delu-
sional belief that a person known to them is actually a 
double, and even see subtle differences between the orig-
inal and the supposed double. In the case of the Fregoli 
delusion, patients believe that a family member or friend 
has taken on the appearance of a stranger, or that one fam-
ily member has turned into another family member. 
 Delusional syndromes can occur in a number of psy-
chiatric disorders, including schizophrenia, affective dis-
orders, dementias, personality disorders and psychologi-
cal disorders of organic origin. Despite the prominence 
of delusions in psychopathology, their etiology still is 
poorly understood. This article gives an overview of the 
principal current theories on the origin of delusional dis-
orders, particularly models of organic brain dysfunction, 
together with a discussion of their potentials and limita-
tions. 
 Organic Correlates of Delusion 
 Delusional Disorders of Organic Origin 
 Delusional syndromes can occur in a number of neu-
rological and other disorders  [1] , including brain tumor, 
trauma to the skull and brain, cerebrovascular disorders, 
Huntington’s chorea, epilepsy, infectious diseases affect-
ing the central nervous system (e.g., HIV), endocrine dis-
orders (e.g., hypothyroid disorder, impaired renal func-
tion) and autoimmune diseases (e.g., systemic lupus ery-
thematosus). Delusional syndromes can also be caused by 
neurotoxic agents, such as heavy metals, and some recre-
ational drugs. This led to the original assumption that or-
ganic factors could underlie delusional disorders. 
 Regarding the anatomical correlates of delusional dis-
orders of organic origin, it was discovered early on that 
epileptic foci in the temporal limbic regions, especially in 
the left hemisphere, are associated with symptoms resem-
bling schizophrenia  [2] . Focal injury to the limbic system 
can also lead to delusions. The importance of left tempo-
ral lesions in these cases has been known for some time 
now  [3] . Brain tumors, cerebrovascular disease and injury 
to the subcortical structures have also been associated 
with delusions  [4] . Cummings  [1, 5] postulated that para-
noid syndromes are likelier to occur after limbic and sub-
cortical trauma or dysfunction, and that there is a clear 
correlation with predominantly left-side injury, a hypoth-
esis which already was proposed by Davison and Bagley 
 [6] . The delusional contents were similar to those seen in 
delusional disorders without a clear organic cause. Thus, 
following an extensive study of case histories, it was pos-
sible to establish the existence of a Capgras syndrome in 
patients with systemic illness such as hepatic encephalop-
athy, vitamin B 12  deficiency, hypothyroid disorder or dia-
betes mellitus. In the case of structural injury, Alexander 
et al.  [7] thought that a combination of bilateral frontal 
and right temporal lesions played a significant role in the 
formation of a Capgras syndrome, whereas other authors 
thought lesions or dysfunctions in the right hemisphere 
to be more important  [8–11] . To increase the intricacy of 
localization, Signer  [12] emphasized the importance of 
frontal and temporal structures and summarized that le-
sions in the left temporal or right frontal areas are often 
associated with Capgras syndrome. Indeed, it may well be 
that patients showing delusions due to neurological and/
or other somatic disorders may in fact constitute rather 
dramatic clinical cases, but not a truly representative 
group. Cummings  [1, 5] pointed out that while it may not 
be possible to rule out the influence of pre-existing psy-
chiatric illness or other predisposing factors (e.g., hered-
ity, living conditions) from these cross-sectional samples, 
these factors had usually not been taken into account. 
Likewise, qualitative, quantitative and dynamic aspects of 
delusions or their development were hardly looked at. A 
prospective study by Cummings  [1] revealed different 
clusters of delusional disorders which, depending on the 
severity and specificity of the neurological illness, ranged 
from simple delusions of persecution to reduplicative par-
amnesia and anosognosis, the latter associated with spe-
cific neurological disorders. In most of the 20 cases in this 
study, delusions decreased as cure of the underlying dis-
order progressed (as is also seen in delusions of organic 
origin). 
 Using carefully documented case histories of patients 
with organic illness or injuries to the brain, different mod-
els were proposed for delusional disorders of organic ori-
gin in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Delusions of patients with 
pronounced neuropsychological illness were looser and 
simpler, and often passing. Patients with complex and 
highly structured delusions, on the other hand, showed 
only slight cognitive impairment. This inverse correlation 
between neuropsychological impairment and the com-
plexity of delusions may indicate that largely intact cogni-
tive functions are an important prerequisite for elaborate 
delusional processing. Patients with Alzheimer’s or multi-
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infarct dementia affecting mainly the neocortical associa-
tive areas show simple delusions that are readily medi-
cated. Complex delusions, on the other hand, tend to be 
seen in patients with extrapyramidal illness or with trau-
matic, neoplastic or cerebrovascular injury affecting 
mainly the subcortical areas (e.g., basal ganglia, thalamus) 
or the limbic system. Patients with lesions in these regions 
who show complex delusions are intellectually only slight-
ly impaired: the delusions tend to become chronic and are 
largely resistant to treatment. Regarding lesions in the 
limbic system, laterality effects are important inasmuch as 
left-side injury tends to correlate with chronic schizo-
phrenia-type disorders whereas right-side parietal tem-
poral lesions are associated more with brief, sporadic hal-
lucinatory and/or delusional episodes  [4, 13] . It was also 
shown that lesions in the right hemisphere are involved in 
the formation of Capgras syndrome and reduplicative 
paramnesia  [14] . 
 These correlations between organic brain disorders, 
including structural injuries to certain brain regions, sug-
gest that impaired brain function is likely to play a role in 
the pathogenesis of delusional disorders. Considering the 
neuropsychological functions of different brain struc-
tures, it becomes apparent that these regions, being part 
of complex neuronal regulatory cycles, are responsible for 
language- and perception-related as well as emotional 
processing  [15] . It is believed that patients with a delu-
sional syndrome (as in disorders of the limbic system) 
have unusual emotional experiences which are then made 
into delusions when interpreted by other, still intact re-
gions of the brain. Hence, injury to subcortical areas like 
the basal ganglia is assumed to lead to specific dysfunc-
tions of the neurotransmitter system, which in turn can 
lead to delusional syndromes via cognitive and emotional 
changes  [1, 16] . In cortical dysfunction, right-side tempo-
ral parietal lesions are thought to lead to abnormal per-
ception processes, which results in hallucinations and de-
lusions due to deficient limbic processing. Conversely, fo-
cal left temporal injury is thought to impair limbic 
participation in linguistic processing, with possible devel-
opment of delusional disorders  [17] . 
 These models are built on a great number of clinical 
observations showing that delusional disorders can arise 
from different injuries or dysfunctions of various brain 
regions. A feature common to all cases is impaired limbic 
cortical processing while a certain minimum of intellec-
tual capacity is retained. Since not all patients with injury 
in these regions develop delusions, there must be further 
predisposing factors such as heredity, site and extent of the 
lesion, as well as premorbid personality traits. These ad-
ditional factors could help to shed light on this issue, par-
ticularly the idiosyncratic content of delusional thinking 
and experiences. These aspects also are central to several 
other theories. 
 Findings of Imaging and Neurophysiological Studies 
 Although organic illness or injury to certain brain re-
gions and delusional syndromes are often related, many 
delusional patients show no such lesions. Only a few 
of them have been examined using imaging methods 
such as single-photon emission computed tomography 
(SPECT), positron emission tomography (PET) or func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to locate func-
tional correlates of their illness. A PET study on chronic 
schizophrenia patients  [18] showed significant positive 
correlations between a global, reality perception-related 
complex of symptoms (including delusional experiences) 
and regional cerebral blow flood (rCBF) in the lateral pre-
frontal cortex, the ventral striatum and the temporal cor-
tex (especially in the superior temporal gyrus and the 
parahippocampal regions). In a PET study on non-medi-
cated schizophrenics, Kaplan et al.  [19] found a correla-
tion between left temporal rCBF activity patterns and the 
complex of reality perception-related symptoms. In a 
SPECT study of non-medicated schizophrenics, Ebmeier 
et al.  [20] found negative activation effects in the left tem-
poral striatum, but hyperactivation in the left striatum. A 
SPECT study by Sabri et al.  [21] showed a significant cor-
relation between the extent of delusional disorders and 
rCBF in the left frontal and the frontal medial regions. 
Although no data were given on the direction of causality 
for the correlations found (a common problem with cor-
relation studies), the findings reported for the medial 
temporal and the ventral striatal regions of the limbic sys-
tem are remarkable. Refining the methodology with mul-
tidimensional scaling to statistically calculate and plot the 
relative position of the regional activation patterns, it was 
possible to examine metabolic factors in delusional syn-
dromes more precisely. In a SPECT study of delusional 
schizophrenic patients, Erkwoh et al.  [22] found indices 
for a functional disconnectivity between frontal and tem-
poral mesial limbic regions. Nevertheless, the correlations 
between rCBF parameters and quantified acute delusion-
al-schizophrenic disorders were remarkably low. Interest-
ingly, the strength of the correlations varied with the com-
plexity of the schizophrenic symptoms (this in addition to 
delusional disorders). Nasrallah et al.  [23] already report-
ed a functional disconnectivity, although he associated a 
decreased interhemispheric information transfer with de-
lusional disorders. An experimental cognitive study by 
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Romney and Mosley  [24] also showed hemispheric pro-
cessing deficits in paranoid schizophrenics. 
 Recent studies (also using MR voxel-based morphom-
etry) show a correlation of delusional schizophrenic dis-
orders with reduced gray matter in the left frontal lobe 
 [25] , impaired top-down support for overriding automat-
ic responses in connection with dysfunctional activity of 
the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex  [26] as well as failure 
of the memory strategies associated with a functional dis-
ruption of dorsolateral prefrontal and temporal-limbic 
structures  [27] . Regarding the delusional symptoms com-
plex in particular, evidence has been mounting for dys-
functional connections between the frontal cortex, multi-
modal association areas and paralimbic structures, result-
ing in cognitive-perceptual-affective dissonance, which 
under specific conditions may cause delusions  [28–32] . 
Examining paranoid schizophrenics, Ha et al.  [33] found 
a significant reduction of gray matter in the left insular 
and the dorsolateral prefrontal regions, and bilaterally in 
the medial frontal, anterior cingulate, inferior frontal and 
superior temporal regions. On the other hand, patients 
showed significantly more gray matter in the bilateral cer-
ebellum and the right striatum than did controls. Interest-
ingly, there was a negative correlation between the sever-
ity score for ‘lack of insight and judgment’ and gray matter 
concentrations in the left posterior, the right anterior cin-
gulate and bilateral inferior temporal regions, including 
the lateral fusiform gyri. In addition to the role of the fron-
tal regulatory circuits, recent studies have shown an im-
portant role of the paralimbic structures in the patho-
physiology of delusions and involvement of the percep-
tual and monitoring systems in the associate mechanism 
of insight. 
 Unlike the above-mentioned imaging methods, event-
related potentials can provide precise data on early infor-
mation processing as a biological marker. In schizophren-
ics, the auditory P300 amplitude of standard oddball dis-
crimination tasks was reduced and delayed – mainly in 
the left temporal lobe, i.e., the posterior superior temporal 
gyrus with inconsistent volume reduction – and there was 
a correlation to enhanced global scores of positive symp-
toms as well as thought disorders, poor clinical outcome 
or negative symptoms  [34–40] . Still, O’Donell et al.  [41] 
found that in delusional patients, there was a particular 
correlation of the P300 amplitude and left posterior supe-
rior temporal gyrus volume. All together, the reductionist 
approach of a positive/negative dichotomy has led to some 
heterogeneous conclusions. Results of a more syndromal 
approach were findings of a smaller P300 in melancholic 
patients with psychotic features, i.e., hallucinations and/
or delusions  [42] . A recent study  [43] found that patients 
with a delusional misidentification syndrome showed less 
excessive reduction of left prefrontal P300 amplitude but 
prolonged latency in the central midline region as op-
posed to schizophrenics without delusional misidentifica-
tion syndrome. Generally, patients with a paranoid sub-
type of schizophrenia – characterized by delusions or hal-
lucinations, absence of flat affect and disorganized speech 
or behavior, and little cognitive impairment – tend to 
show fewer reductions of cognitive event-related poten-
tials than do undifferentiated schizophrenics. An im-
paired frontal processing negativity and mismatch nega-
tivity (P1, N1, P2, MMN) was mostly bilateral in paranoid 
but lateralized in non-paranoid schizophrenics, indicat-
ing that the paranoid patients retained a better preserva-
tion of the frontal-temporal dialogue in distinguishing 
relevant from irrelevant stimuli  [44] . Together with better 
verbal skills, application of phonetical versus tonal stim-
uli leads to greater frontocentral N2 peaks with left-hemi-
sphere dominance in paranoid schizophrenics  [45] . How-
ever, disorders of the first stages of information process-
ing (P2) and automatic categorization processing (N2) of 
non-target stimuli were also found to correlate specifi-
cally to hallucinations and delusions  [37] , which may in-
dicate subtle early attentional deficits as an underlying 
factor. 
 Deficits in semantic processing (N400) point to abnor-
mal activation of semantic networks with insufficient 
context utilization, but findings are inconsistent. Apart 
from preliminary data implying a lacking indirect prim-
ing effect in delusional patients without formal thought 
disorders  [46] , no systematic studies of delusions have 
been done so far. 
 Perry and Braff  [47] also showed a correlation of delu-
sions in schizophrenia and deficits in sensorimotor gating 
(measured using prepulse inhibition of the eye blink star-
tle reflex). In a different paradigm, impaired prepulse in-
hibition was associated with greater delusions and suspi-
cion only when following attended prepulse versus ig-
nored prepulse  [48] , thus pointing to some basic 
anticipatory attentional modulations of delusional symp-
toms. Early sensory gating deficits with poorer P50 sup-
pression were reported in subjects with more perceptual 
abnormalities and magical ideation  [49] . A habituation 
deficit of the blink reflex also was found in depressive pa-
tients with delusions  [50] . 
 Mounting evidence of a thalamic-cortical imbalance in 
schizophrenia has led to research into high-frequency os-
cillations (possibly inhibitory in nature) of cortical so-
matosensory evoked potentials, which presumably are 
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generated in the afferent thalamocortical and early corti-
cal fibers. Early high-frequency oscillations were absent 
in schizophrenia  [51] , and the higher amplitude in the 
low-frequency range showed a markedly inverse correla-
tion to formal thought disorders and delusions  [52] . 
Hence, delusional processing may also be caused by dys-
functional mechanisms of filtering and inhibition of ir-
relevant stimuli at the thalamic level before reaching the 
neocortex. Neurophysiological research may complement 
the morphopathometric methods, although this approach 
has not been pursued in great detail yet. We also can dis-
cern a parallel to neuropsychological research here. 
 Neuropsychological Findings 
 Since a variety of CNS and psychological disorders and 
delusions are related, it could well be that neuropsycho-
logical examinations will yield clues to subtle brain dys-
functions in delusional patients – regardless of the as-
sumed etiology of the delusion. It is noteworthy that delu-
sions are often associated with pronounced cognitive 
abnormalities  [53] . It was expected that delusions would 
eventually correlate with specific impairments of cogni-
tive processing (e.g., attentiveness, learning and memory, 
perception, planning, logical thinking), but research does 
not appear to support this hypothesis so far. 
 Maher  [54] was one of the first to suspect neurocogni-
tive dysfunctions in delusional patients. In his theory of 
‘perceptive-cognitive anomalies’, he stressed a neuropsy-
chological causality by assuming disorders of basic cogni-
tive processing (e.g., losses in perception and attentive-
ness) to underlie delusional disorders. If filtering of stim-
uli (relevant versus irrelevant) is impaired, incoming 
stimuli will gain in complexity while losing coherence and 
consistency, thus leading to insecurity and disorientation 
in an environment which the patient perceives as first al-
tered and then threatening. In order to alleviate the situ-
ation, the patient explains these changes by assigning 
them meanings and making connections. Delusional ide-
ation and processing would thus be seen as the autochtho-
nous conceptualization of an excessively complex, ‘un-
consciously’ experienced altered perception. It remains 
unclear, however, to which group of patients Maher’s data 
apply. More recent neuropsychological studies show that 
subjects with ‘pure’ delusions tend not to show any severe 
neuropsychological dysfunctions. Reviewing more than 
32 neuropsychological articels, Zalewski et al.  [55] found 
no great differences in cognitive performance between 
paranoid and non-paranoid schizophrenics. Further-
more, neuropsychological data are scarce for non-schizo-
phrenic delusional patients, mainly because the disorder 
is rare and because patients usually do not see themselves 
as such, and so do not seek medical help or participate in 
scientific studies. Indeed, paranoid schizophrenics some-
times do better at executive functions, attentiveness, 
learning and memory tests. Nevertheless, many of the 
studies had methodological flaws, thus limiting their 
comparability; such as standardized, empirically validat-
ed tests not always being used for examining cognitive 
functions. 
 The study by Kremen et al.  [56] is a case in point: per-
formance for higher verbal (but not visual) memory was 
found to be associated with systematic, complex delu-
sions, but these differences disappeared when comparing 
only paranoid with non-paranoid schizophrenics using 
the then current DSM-III-R criteria. Likewise, Bornstein 
et al.  [57] found a higher fluidity of speech in paranoid 
than in non-paranoid and schizoaffective schizophrenics, 
but this difference also disappeared after controlling for 
group differences regarding education, medication and 
number of psychopathological symptoms. No group dif-
ferences between paranoid and non-paranoid patients 
were found for expressive speech or language-related re-
ceptive abilities  [58, 59] . An exception was the study by 
Langell et al.  [60] , who observed that delusional schizo-
phrenics showed better language comprehension, expres-
sion and writing compared to non-paranoid schizophren-
ics. Kremen et al.  [56] also found better language skills in 
patients with complex delusions, but these differences 
also disappeared when the data were re-analyzed accord-
ing to DSM-III-R criteria (paranoid versus non-para-
noid). 
 Unlike classical neuropsychological examinations, 
where individual cognitive functions are assessed, statisti-
cal classification studies  [61–64] part from the usual cri-
teria like DSM-III (i.e., paranoid versus non-paranoid) 
and instead classify groups according to neuropsycholog-
ical test performance. Disregarding nosological boundar-
ies has lately become very popular in psychiatric research. 
The above-mentioned studies yielded three subgroups: 
(1) a globally impaired group characterized by avolition, 
social withdrawal and blunted affect; (2) a group with 
slight cognitive disorders, characterized mainly by disor-
ganized behavior and thinking (alogia, bizarre behavior, 
attentiveness and formal thought disorders), and (3) a 
neuropsychologically unremarkable group characterized 
solely by systematic delusions. The authors of these stud-
ies concluded that delusional disorders are associated 
only with slight cognitive impairments, if any. It was once 
again proposed that elaborate delusions require an intact 
neurocognitive system. 
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 Summarizing the results of these neuropsychological 
studies, it appears that paranoid schizophrenics, in spite 
of their different cognitive style, show fewer neuropsy-
chological disorders than do non-paranoid schizophren-
ics. So far, no indices for localizable cerebral dysfunctions 
in paranoid disorders have been found in neuropsycho-
logical studies, although the results are heterogeneous, 
probably at least in part due to different diagnostic crite-
ria, the influence of medication, artifacts produced by 
spot sampling, as well as different neuropsychological 
tests. Regarding the problem of inclusion and exclusion 
criteria, Sorensen et al.  [65] pointed out that these factors 
may artificially increase or decrease the number of para-
noid or non-paranoid test subjects, thereby also skewing 
the test data for group comparisons. Bornstein et al.  [57] 
also showed that between-group differences in cognitive 
performance could be due to confounding variables (see 
above). Finally, Kremen et al.  [56] emphasized the impor-
tance of qualitative and quantitative aspects of delusions, 
an approach which seems promising, given that consider-
ing disorder-related characteristics across the various 
classifications had already been proposed by Bilder et al. 
 [61] and Liddle et al.  [63] . Even so, the neuropsychologi-
cal correlates of delusion remain to be identified, espe-
cially in view of methodological problems. Assuming var-
ious levels of brain dysfunction in delusional disorders 
 [66] , the question also arises whether the neuropsycho-
logical examination methods currently used are not in 
fact too coarse to detect subtle organic brain changes or 
differences. Hypothesis-oriented research that takes into 
account the above-mentioned organic abnormalities of 
the brain seems more promising, although emotional or 
affective processing would have to be taken into consid-
eration. 
 Neuronal Network Models 
 The neuronal network theory offers another explana-
tion. According to this theory, delusions are seen as a 
complex activity pattern of neuronal networks which ex-
hibit a special type of organization and are termed ‘maps’ 
(comparable to the somatosensory, motor, retinotopic 
and tonotopic brain centers). A central tenet of this theo-
ry is that these maps are plastic, i.e., they change over a 
person’s life. This is taken from the neurosciences, which 
have conclusively proven the plasticity of the functional 
organization of the brain, as following amputations. The 
network theory was first advanced by Hoffman  [67] to 
explain psychopathological syndromes, and later refined 
by Spitzer  [68] , particularly regarding delusions. Spitzer 
 [68] assumes a connection between acute delusions and 
dopaminergic or noradrenergic hyperactivity. The mount-
ing anxiety and insecurity which accompany acute delu-
sions would thus go together with a neuromodulatory 
condition characterized by an increased noise-to-signal 
ratio in those neuronal networks responsible for the high-
er mental faculties. This would cause patients to focus 
more strongly on irrelevant events, increasing their sub-
jective meaning. Once these meanings are activated in the 
semantic networks, they can influence subsequent per-
ception and thinking, leading to delusional processing 
like ascribing meanings, starting relationships for no rea-
son or being unable to judge different viewpoints criti-
cally. Acute delusions can then enter other higher-level 
cortical maps as input and there interact with experiences 
or other psychotically distorted ideas. The longer psy-
chotic symptoms persist, the greater the likelihood of 
them altering the patient’s personal attitudes or opinions. 
Hence, chronic delusions are understood as alterations of 
higher-level cortical map-like representational systems. 
Spitzer draws a parallel between Janzarik’s  [69] structural 
deformation which, neurobiologically speaking, would 
constitute a dynamic neuroplastic alteration. However, 
these alterations are also of therapeutic significance and 
Spitzer suggests different neuroleptic medication for acute 
or chronic delusions, depending on their noradrenergic 
and dopaminergic modulation. With chronic delusions, 
the altered maps require specific input, as through behav-
ioral therapy. Behavioral therapy is also well suited be-
cause it simulates the effects of both classical and opera-
tional methods in network models  [70] . It is therefore es-
sential to create new experiences to counteract both 
emotional and cognitive processing. Although this theory 
seems very attractive, a new operationalization – and 
hence empirical validation – of this approach would be 
difficult. Unfortunately, research in this direction has not 
been pursued further. 
 Theories of Neurocognitive and Emotional 
Dysfunctions 
 Unlike the above-mentioned theories, the theory of 
mind, the probabilistic reasoning theory and the theory 
of attributional bias deal with neurocognitive abnormali-
ties in delusional disorders and their organic correlates. 
Scientific study of the emotional aspects is only begin-
ning. The following sections summarize the main aspects 
of these theories regarding organic correlates of brain dys-
function. 
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 Theory of Mind 
 Gallese  [71] proposed that the capacity to understand 
others as intentional agents could well be a basic organi-
zational feature of our brain, enabling our rich and diver-
sified intersubjective experiences. This perspective could 
be in a position to offer a global approach to the under-
standing of the vulnerability to major psychoses such as 
schizophrenia. On this note, the theory of mind (ToM) 
refers to the capacity of attributing mental states such as 
intentions, knowledge, beliefs, thinking and willing to 
oneself as well as to others. Amongst other things, this ca-
pacity allows us to predict the behavior of others. The 
ToM also includes the knowledge that the beliefs and de-
sires of others may differ from our own. Central tenets of 
the ToM are beliefs, desires and actions. Together with our 
own beliefs and desires, our mental picture of reality leads 
us to decide on this or that course of action. However, the 
mental picture does not always correspond to actual real-
ity. Meanwhile, there are now several fMRI studies which 
support the cortical correlates of the ToM. Frith  [72] pos-
tulated that paranoid syndromes exhibit a specific ToM 
deficit, e.g., delusions of reference can be explained, at 
least in good part, by the patients’ inability to put them-
selves in another person’s place and thus correctly assess 
their behavior and intentions. Thought insertion and ide-
ations of control by others can be traced back to dysfunc-
tional monitoring of one’s own intentions and actions. 
Hence, thoughts enter the patient’s consciousness without 
his or her awareness of any intention to initiate these 
thoughts. The inability of these patients to correct errors 
is also believed to rest on an internal monitoring disorder. 
However, the question remains whether delusional ideas 
in a narrow sense and symptoms like thought insertion or 
other positive symptoms of schizophrenia should be dis-
cussed under the same perspective. Seen from this angle, 
serious neurophenomenological arguments against the 
global theory of meta-representational self-monitoring 
processing deficits in schizophrenic patients emerged  [73, 
74] . Nevertheless, Frith and Frith  [75] found a particu-
larly strong correlation of the medial and the lateral infe-
rior prefrontal cortex and the temporal parietal transition 
brain regions with delusions and ToM deficits. Since de-
luded patients in symptomatic remission performed as 
well as normal controls at ToM tasks, ToM deficits seem 
to be a state rather than a trait variable  [76] . Furthermore, 
the specificity of ToM deficits in delusions is also ques-
tionable because delusional patients may perform nor-
mally at ToM tasks  [77] . Nevertheless, it is currently held 
that the medial prefrontal cortex is important for the per-
ception of self  [78] whereas the lateral frontal inferior cor-
tex plays an important role – via mirror neurons – in plan-
ning and carrying out actions  [79–81] . Psychological pro-
cesses, on the other hand, are usually based on observations 
of the behavior of others, and seem to be connected with 
the superior temporal sulcus  [82] . Another part of the ‘so-
cial brain’ circuitry which may be relevant in the context 
of ToM is the amygdala  [83] . Recent work by Shaw et al. 
 [84] suggests that lesions to the amygdala interfere with 
ToM reasoning most consistently if they were acquired 
relative early in life. This agrees with developmental theo-
ries of schizophrenia but the etiological relevance of ToM 
in delusional disorders is yet to be determined. 
 The Role of Emotions in Delusional Disorders 
 In addition to ToM deficits, the etiological relevance of 
which to delusions is increasingly being questioned, evi-
dence has been mounting for some time now that emo-
tional processes must be given special consideration, even 
if their exact role is not well understood yet  [85] . Delu-
sions driven by underlying affect (mood congruent) may 
differ neurocognitively from those which have no such 
connection (mood incongruent)  [86] . Thus, specific ‘de-
lusion’-related autobiographical memory contents may be 
resistant to ‘normal’ forgetting processes, and so can esca-
late into continuous biased recall of mood-congruent 
memories and beliefs  [86] . Regarding threat and aversive 
response, identification of emotionally weighted stimuli 
relevant to delusions of persecution has been associated 
with activation of the amygdala and the anterior insula 
 [87] . Limbic-mediated inappropriate conjunction of af-
fective tone to memories of imaginary events could im-
pair reality monitoring and lead to delusions by adding 
misleading contextual information  [88] . Seen in this con-
text, it must also be kept in mind that schizophrenic pa-
tients show morphometric abnormalities of the amygdala, 
the thalamus, the hippocampus and the insula  [89, 90] , 
which by itself may indicate disorders such as affectively 
biased information processing. Interestingly, treatment of 
co-morbid mood disorders has been shown to reduce de-
lusions  [91] . The etiology of mood-incongruent delusions 
is less clear. It would therefore be good to take the role 
which emotions and affect play in delusions more into ac-
count. 
 Probabilistic Reasoning Bias 
 On the other hand, the theory of probabilistic reason-
ing bias  [92] assumes that the probability-based decision-
making process in delusional individuals requires less in-
formation than that of healthy individuals, causing them 
to jump to conclusions, a phenomenon which has been 
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confirmed by a number of studies  [93] . This jumping to 
conclusions is neither a function of impulsive decision-
making nor a consequence of memory deficit  [94] . It has 
been suggested that the characteristic of delusional rea-
soning is the unwillingness to admit anything which 
would appear to refute one’s beliefs  [95] . However, Kemp 
et al.  [96] pointed out that delusional patients are not de-
luded about everything and that there may be no global 
deficit in reasoning abilities. Goel et al.  [97] found that 
healthy controls are most accurate on a syllogistic reason-
ing task, where they can mobilize their pre-existing be-
liefs, but not when the beliefs are irrelevant or emotive. 
On the other hand, schizophrenic patients were signifi-
cantly less accurate at this task than controls in general. 
The authors assume that the excessive parallel mobiliza-
tion of salient and irrelevant beliefs may be typical for 
dysfunctional reasoning processing in schizophrenic pa-
tients. Considering different underlying cerebral net-
work processing, Goel and Dolan  [98] showed that acti-
vation of the right lateral prefrontal cortex occurs when 
subjects inhibit responses associated with belief in order 
to reach the correct solution to a logical reasoning task, 
while the ventral medial prefrontal cortex is activated 
when reason is overruled by belief. Sanfey et al.  [99] re-
ported similar findings. One might hypothesize an im-
balance in these neural processing systems in delusional 
patients, but taken together, the findings in reasoning 
abilities in delusional patients are only subtle and one 
might question the strength of their causality in delu-
sional thinking. 
 Theory of Attributional Bias 
 In his theory of attributional style and self-discrepan-
cies, Bentall  [100, 101] and others proposed that negative 
events that could potentially threaten the self-esteem are 
attributed to others (externalized causal attribution) so as 
to avoid a discrepancy between the ideal self and the self 
as it is experienced. An extreme form of a self-serving at-
tributional style should explain the formation of delusion-
al beliefs, at least in cases where the delusional network is 
based on ideas of persecution, without any co-occurring 
perceptual or experiential anomaly. During the course of 
illness, the preferential encoding and recall of delusion-
sensitive material can be assumed to continually reinforce 
and propagate the delusional belief  [102] . Using psycho-
physiological methods, it could be shown that patients ex-
periencing delusions of persecution were quick to iden-
tify the threatening elements in ‘ambiguous’ pictures but, 
rather counter-intuitively, actually spent less time reap-
praising these threatening elements than did controls 
without delusions of persecution  [103] . Patients may also 
expect a threat where none exists. 
 Blackwood et al.  [104] found that non-self-serving at-
tributional bias is associated with activity in the left pre-
central gyrus, a region which is thought to play an impor-
tant role in the executive control of behavior inhibition 
 [105] as well as in semantic memory representation. The 
authors believe that in delusional patients, self-serving at-
tributional bias is mainly a motivationally prepotent re-
sponse, with the corresponding activity in the precentral 
gyrus representing the inhibitory process necessary for 
this particular attributional bias. However, Blackwood et 
al.  [102] point out that those brain regions where delu-
sional patients show remarkable cognitive activation are 
largely those which correlate with the extent of delusional 
disorders in other patients. Furthermore, these are also 
the regions where paranoid schizophrenic patients show 
structural  [106, 107] and functional abnormalities  [108] . 
Particularly in the case of paranoia and the sociocognitive 
dysfunctions thought to be associated with it, Blackwood 
et al.  [102] believe that the amygdala and the ventral me-
dial prefrontal cortex are also involved. Their assumption 
is based on the fact that the amygdala plays a significant 
role in encoding and recall of emotionally and socially 
relevant clues such as facial expression  [109] , something 
which could be observed in many patients with lesions in 
this region. The ventral medial prefrontal cortex, on the 
other hand, is thought to play an important role in assess-
ing social situations regarding their emotional and social 
significance to the individual, according to Damasio’s the-
ory of the self  [110] . Taken together, hypoactivation would 
characterize the delusional state, reflecting excessive at-
tention to self-referential information with a diminished 
capability to inhibit the self-serving attributional bias. 
 Recent work with fMRI  [111] has shown that when de-
lusional patients evaluate potentially negative personal 
statements, they show less activation of the rostral-ventral 
anterior cingulate cortex – a region noted for self-moni-
toring – yet show greater activation in the posterior cin-
gulate gyrus than do normal controls. The authors suggest 
that this underlies impaired self-reflection in delusional 
states involving ideas of persecution. Here, too, the etio-
logical relevance of this approach is questionable. 
 Nevertheless, research of the cerebral correlates of at-
tentiveness distortion or shifting in the sense of attention-
al bias regarding neutral or threatening stimuli has shown 
that these activate a specific neuronal network which in-
cludes the left lateral inferior frontal cortex, the ventral 
striatum and the anterior cingulate, the left lateral inferior 
frontal cortex handling semantic processing  [112] , the 
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ventral striatum contributes to the egocentric memory 
 [113] , and anterior sections of the cingulate cortex to the 
motivational content of stimuli  [114] . Further support for 
a neurobiological contribution to the development of de-
lusions has recently been reported. Zwanzger et al.  [115] 
attempted to treat depression in a patient using repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the left 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. After several sessions, the 
patient developed severe psychotic symptoms with ideas 
of persecution – which he had never had before. These 
disappeared when rTMS was combined with medication. 
Interestingly, it was recently shown that acute rTMS has a 
dopaminergic action in healthy volunteers  [116] . Future 
work may clarify whether alteration or amelioration of 
perceptual input in ‘perceptual’ delusions can attenuate 
delusional belief. Hoffman et al.  [117] have recently shown 
that auditory hallucinations can be greatly reduced by 
slow (1-Hz) TMS stimulation of the inferior temporal 
lobe, which is adjacent to the primary auditory cortex. 
 Summary 
 The data available on neurobiological, cognitive and 
neuropsychological correlates of delusions suggest dys-
functions of the prefrontal, limbic and subcortical re-
gions, but further research is needed. Still, a neurobio-
logically sound and empirically validated theory of delu-
sions is not in sight, although recent examination methods 
are better at detecting abnormal brain structures or con-
nectivities. However, a simple model assuming purely or-
ganic causes is not enough since delusions can occur with-
out any detectable brain disorder. Neurobiological factors 
are only a venue through which psychological processes 
operate and, regarding delusions, counterbalance belief 
structures. Delusional disorders are likely to be caused by 
a combination of neurobiological, cognitive and other 
psychological factors. It is no surprise, therefore, to find 
different contending hypotheses and the data somewhat 
inconsistent, even contradictory. The competing ap-
proaches are good inasmuch as each sheds light on a dif-
ferent aspect of delusional symptoms, aspects for which a 
unified theory may perhaps be developed in the future. In 
closing, it should be pointed out that, to a greater or a 
lesser extent, all the neurobiological, psychological and 
neuropsychological approaches listed here stress cogni-
tion, yet the specific interaction between emotional and 
cognitive areas has hardly been investigated, which is sur-
prising since delusions have a strong emotional compo-
nent. Research on delusion always was and always will be 
at the center of psychiatric conceptualization. It is very 
unlikely that this complex phenomenon – and paranoid 
and schizophrenic psychoses in general – will be traced 
back to one single cause. The fact that patients can very 
well ‘overcome’ their delusions could indicate that these 
are not quite so fixed and immobile and that there may be 
subgroups with different etiologies, although we are only 
beginning to understand them. 
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